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I. Introduction 
Several court decisions applying Colorado law during the relevant time 
period of this update materially impact the oil and gas industry.   
In OXY USA Inc. v. Mesa Cty. Bd. of Commissioners,
1
 the Supreme 
Court of Colorado considered whether an oil and gas company was entitled 
to tax abatement due to an overvaluation of leasehold interest caused solely 
by the company itself.  Two cases, one a federal district court opinion 
(Maralex Res., Inc. v. Jewell
2
) and the other a decision issued by the 
Colorado Court of Appeals (Maralex Res., Inc. v. Colorado Oil & Gas 
Conservation Comm'n
3
) addressed the constitutionality of administrative 
inspections of oil and gas wells by the Bureau of Land Management 
(“BLM”) and the Colorado Commission of Oil and Gas Conservation 
Commission (“COGCC”).  The obligations of parties under an area-of-
mutual interest agreement, and what actions constitute a breach of this 
agreement, were considered by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in 
Spring Creek Expl. & Prod. Co., LLC v. Hess Bakken Inv., II, LLC.
4
  
Finally, the Colorado Supreme Court granted a petition for a writ of 
certiorari in Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Comm’n v. Martinez.
5
     
In 2018, 311 Senate bills and 475 House bills were introduced.
6
  
Highlighted within this article are bills addressing oil and gas issues, two of 
                                                                                                                 
 1. 2017 CO 104, 405 P.3d 1142 (Colo. 2017). 
 2. 301 F. Supp. 3d 976 (D. Colo. 2017). 
 3. 2018 COA 40 (March 22, 2018). 
 4. 887 F.3d 1003 (10th Cir. 2018), (as revised Apr. 13, 2018). 
 5. 2018 WL 582105 (Colo. Jan. 29, 2018). 
 6. See All Bills, 71st Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2018),  
https://leg.colorado.gov/bill-search?field_subjects[0]=40&field_subjects[1]=38&field_ 
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which passed and eleven other bills that were introduced and debated but 
postponed indefinitely.
7
  This update concludes by summarizing an 
important 2018 COGCC rulemaking relating to flowlines and two ballot 
initiatives materially affecting the oil and gas industry that will appear on 
the 2018 statewide general election ballot. 
II. Case Law 
A. Overvaluation of Oil and Gas Leasehold Assessments 
In OXY USA Inc. v. Mesa Cty. Bd. of Commissioners, the court 
considered whether an oil and gas company was entitled to abatement under 
Colo. Rev. Stat. §39-10-114(1)(a)(I)(A) due to an overvaluation error 
caused by the company itself.
8
  Oil and gas leaseholds are treated, and 
taxed, as real property in Colorado.
9
  In order to ascertain the taxes due on 
leasehold interests, operators are required by statute to provide information 
about the amount of oil and gas sold and produced to the taxation authority 
by filing annual statements; the assessor then uses those annual statements 
to ascribe a value to leasehold interests for taxation.
10
 
In this case, OXY USA, Inc. (“OXY”) filed its annual statement but later 
“discovered that it had failed to deduct certain allowable costs” therefrom, 
resulting in the over-reporting of the “selling price of its gas at the 
wellhead,” and consequently, the overvaluation of its leasehold interests 
and overpayment of taxes thereon.
11
  OXY filed an amended annual 
statement and petitioned for abatement under the above mentioned statute, 
but the Mesa County Board of Commissioners (“County Board”) denied 
OXY’s petition, stating that abatement was not proper when the taxpayer 
was the source of the error.
12
  The Board of Assessment Appeals reversed 
the County Board, finding that OXY was entitled to abatement.
13
  The 
County Board appealed to the Court of Appeals, which agreed with the 
                                                                                                                 
sessions=45771&field_chamber=All&field_bill_type=All&sort_bef_combine=search_api_r
elevance%20DESC. (last visited July 16, 2018). 
 7. 71st Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2018), https://leg.colorado.gov/bill-
search?field_sessions=45771&sort_bef_combine=field_bill_number%20ASC (Search for 
Subjects: Energy, Natural Resources & Environment). 
 8. 2017 CO 104, ¶ 1, 405 P.3d 1142, 1143 (Colo. 2017). 
 9. Id. at ¶ 4, 405 P.3d at 1144. 
 10. Id. at ¶ 5, 405 P.3d at 1144. 
 11. Id. at ¶ 6, 405 P.3d at 1144. 
 12. Id. at ¶¶ 7-8 405 P.3d at 1144. 
 13. Id. at ¶ 9, 405 P.3d at 1144. 
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County Board; OXY then petitioned the Colorado Supreme Court for writ 
of certiorari, which was granted.
14
 
The precise issue upon which writ was granted was as follows:  “whether 
section 39-10-114(1)(a)(I)(A) permits abatement for an error caused solely 
by the taxpayer,” the error being overvaluation.
15
  The court first considered 
the plain language of the aforesaid statute, which “allows the abatement and 
refund of property taxes erroneously or illegally levied ‘due to erroneous 
valuation for assessment, irregularity in levying, clerical error, or 
overvaluation.’”
16
  It found that the statute was significantly silent on the 
source of such error, and that “[t]his silence suggests the source of the error 
does not matter.”
17
  Next, it held that the court of appeals misplaced 
reliance on certain precedent in reaching its decision.  Specifically, the 
court noted that Coquina Oil Corp. v. Larimer County Bd. of 
Equalization,
18
 which pertained to erroneous overvaluation of leasehold 
interests due to clerical error, was inapplicable because two years following 
such decision, the legislature superseded the same by amending the statute 
to expressly address overvaluation.
19
  The legislative history surrounding 
this amendment also indicates an intent to provide broad relief in 
circumstances of overvaluation.
20
  Additionally, the court found that while 
Boulder County Bd. of Commissioners v. HealthSouth Corp.
21
 stated that 
“assessor error may be the most likely cause of overvaluation,” it does 
prevent the issuance of abatement in other circumstances, i.e., when 
someone other than the assessor, such as the taxpayer, is the cause of the 
overvaluation.
22
  Therefore, the court held that Colo. Rev. Stat. §39-10-
114(1)(a)(I)(A) “gives taxpayers the right to seek abatement and refund for 
erroneously or illegally levied taxes resulting from overvaluation caused 
                                                                                                                 
 14. Id. at ¶¶ 10-11, 405 P.3d at 1144. 
 15. Id. at ¶ 15, 405 P.3d at 1145. 
 16. Id. at ¶ 7, 405 P.3d at 1144. 
 17. Id. at ¶ 17, 405 P.3d at 1145. 
 18. 770 P.2d 1196 (Colo. 1989). 
 19. OXY USA Inc.,at ¶¶ 18-21, 405 P.3d at 1145-46. 
 20. Id. at ¶¶ 25-32, 405 P.3d at 1146-47. (According to the court, “[t]he legislative 
declaration accompanying the 1991 amendment is particularly telling: The General 
Assembly explained that it was enacting the bill ‘with the intent of clarifying’ that the court 
of appeals’ statutory interpretation . . . was incorrect and that any taxpayer has ‘the right to 
petition for an abatement or refund of property taxes levied erroneously or illegally due to an 
overvaluation of such taxpayer’s property.’”)  Id. at ¶ 30 (quoting Ch. 309, sec. 1, 1991 
Colo. Sess. Laws 1962, 1962)). 
 21. 246 P.3d 948 (Colo. 2011). 
 22. OXY USA Inc., at ¶ 35, 405 P.3d at 1147. 
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solely by taxpayer mistake,” and reversed the court of appeals’ decision, 
finding that OXY was entitled to the abatement sought.
23
 
B. Search and Seizure Challenges to Administrative Well Inspections 
1. BLM Authority – Federal and Indian Lands 
The court considered the scope of the BLM’s authority to inspect wells 
on fee property when subject to a communitization agreement in Maralex 
Res., Inc. v. Jewell.
24
  In that case, minerals owned by Mr. O’Hare 
(“O’Hare”) were leased to Maralex Resources, Inc. (“Maralex”); Maralex 
then contributed the O’Hare lease to a Communization Agreement (“CA”) 
with minerals owned by the Southern Ute Indian Tribe (“Tribe”).
25
  The 
BLM contacted Maralex to provide notice of their intention to inspect 
certain wells within the CA, including a well located on the O’Hare 
property.
26
  O’Hare refused to let the BLM inspector on his property, and 
consequently, Maralex was issued four Notices of Incidents of 
Noncompliance (“NICs”); the BLM also mandated as corrective action that 
Maralex provide the BLM with keys to the property gates or alternatively 
allow the BLM to place its own locks on the property gates to facilitate 
access.
27
  Eventually O’Hare allowed the BLM to inspect the well and 
Maralex appealed the NICs to the Interior Board of Land Appeals 
(“IBLAs”), which upheld them.
28
 
The court here considered whether the IBLA’s decision to uphold the 
NICs was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in 
accordance with law.”
29
  The IBLA’s authority in the instant case comes 
from the Federal Oil and Gas Royalty Management Act (“FOGRMA”), 
which governs royalty payments from oil and gas leases on Federal and 
Indian lands.
30
  FOGRMA also authorizes the Secretary of the Interior “to 
conduct ‘any investigation or other inquiry necessary and appropriate’ to 
carry out his or her duties under FOGRMA.”
31
  With respect to inspections, 
FOGRMA provides, in relevant part, as follows: 
                                                                                                                 
 23. Id. at ¶ 36, 405 P.3d at 1148. 
 24. 301 F. Supp. 3d 976 (D. Colo. 2017). 
 25. Id. at 979. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 981. 
 30. See id. at 980. 
 31. Id. 
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Authorized and properly identified representatives of the 
Secretary may without advance notice, enter upon, travel across 
and inspect lease sites on Federal or Indian lands and may obtain 
from the operator immediate access to secured facilities on such 
lease sites, for the purpose of making any inspection or 
investigation for determining whether there is compliance with 
the requirements of the mineral leasing laws and this chapter. . . . 
For the purpose of making any inspection or investigation under 
this chapter, the Secretary shall have the same right to enter upon 
or travel across any lease site as the lessee or operator has 
acquired by purchase, condemnation, or otherwise.”
32
 
On appeal, Maralex argued that the BLM had no right “to conduct 
warrantless, unannounced inspections of oil and gas facilities located on fee 
lands,” and even if they were so authorized, FOGRMA does not support the 
directive for landowners “to provide the BLM with keys to the landowner’s 
locked gates or allow the BLM to place its own locks on the landowner’s 
locked gates.”
 33
  Additionally, Maralex contended that such BLM searches 
violate Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable search and 
seizure.
34
  The IBLA determined, and the court affirmed, that although 
FOGRMA “refers only to ‘lease sites on Federal or Indian lands,’ 
production from any lease site subject to a communitization agreement 
(whether on fee or Indian land) is deemed to occur on each lease site within 
the communitization agreement”.
35
 Therefore, because a portion of the 
revenue generated from production of the well on the O’Hare property was 
allocated to the Tribe, the BLM had the authority to inspect wells on fee 
lands subject to a CA.
36
 
The court also found that such BLM searches did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure.
37
  
O’Hare leased his minerals to Maralex, and thus, consented to allowing 
Maralex to enter the property.
38
  Maralex then contributed the O’Hare lease 
                                                                                                                 
 32. Id. at 980, (citing 30 U.S.C. §1718(b), (c)). 
 33. Id. at 981. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 982-83.  
 36. Id  at 983 (“FOGRMA requires the development of procedures to ensure proper 
collection and disbursement of oil and gas revenues owed to Indian lessors from oil and gas 
both originating from, and allocated to, Indian Lands.”)  (citations omitted). 
 37. Id. at 984-85 
 38. Id. at 984. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol4/iss3/4
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to a CA and “agreed to the BLM’s supervision over all operations subject to 
the agreement”; consequently, the BLM acquired the same right to enter 
O’Hare’s lands as Maralex.
39
  Further, so long as the inspections performed 
by the BLM do not exceed the scope of the CA or the applicable statutes 
and regulations, “providing the BLM with keys to the O’Hares’ locked 
gates, or placing the BLM’s own locks on O’Hares’ gates, does not violate 
Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights.”
40
 
2. COGCC Authority – Fee Lands 
A similar search and seizure argument, also including O’Hare, was 
decided in Maralex Res., Inc. v. Colorado Oil & Gas Conservation 
Comm'n.
41
  Maralex operated three wells on O’Hare’s surface.
42
  A field 
inspector for the COGCC contacted Maralex requesting access to the wells 
to perform an inspection.
43
  O’Hare was out of town so the inspector agreed 
to delay inspection until the following day provided that Maralex contact 
him “oil-field early,” an oil field custom and practice reference to 6:00 
a.m.
44
  When the inspector had not heard from Maralex by 9:30 a.m., he 
issued a notice of alleged violation for failure to provide access to the 
wells.
45
  Later that day, O’Hare spoke with the inspector and sent a follow-
up email in which he agreed to provide access to the wells for inspection 
the following week; however, the correspondence also threatened the 
inspector should he attempt to otherwise enter his property.
46
 The COGCC 
obtained an administrative search warrant to inspect the wells and executed 
the same, during which the inspector noted several violations.
47
  A follow-
up inspection was conducted and the violations were found to be ongoing, 
so the COGCC issued Maralex multiple notices of alleged violation.
48
  
Maralex requested an administrative hearing to challenge these notices, at 
which the notices were upheld and the COGCC issued an order finding 
violation (“OFV”).
49
  O’Hare and Maralex appealed the COGCC’s OFV to 
                                                                                                                 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. 2018 COA 40, 2018 WL 1417462 (Colo. App. March 22, 2018). 
 42. Id. at ¶ 4, 2018 WL 1417462 at *1. 
 43. Id. at ¶ 7, 2018 WL 1417462 at *2. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at ¶ 8, 2018 WL 1417462 at *2. 
 46. Id. at ¶ 9, 2018 WL 1417462 at *2. 
 47. Id. at ¶¶ 10-11, 2018 WL 1417462 at *2. 
 48. Id. at ¶ 12-13, 2018 WL 1417462 at *3. 
 49. Id. at ¶ 13, 2018 WL 1417462 at *3. 
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The main contention on appeal, which was a matter of first impression 
for the court, was whether the “COGCC rule permitting random, 
warrantless searches of oil and gas properties violates the United States and 
Colorado Constitutions.”
51
  The court characterized this claim as “a facial 
challenge to the constitutionality of Rule 204, which permits authorized 
COGCC staff ‘the right at all reasonable times to go upon and inspect any 
oil or gas properties.’”
52
  The court disagreed with the petitioner’s 
arguments and concluded that Rule 204 falls under the administrative 
search exception, known as the Colonnade-Biswell exception, to the 
warrant requirement.
53
  Said exception provides that:  
“[A] warrantless inspection made pursuant to a regulatory 
scheme of a closely regulated industry is reasonable if three 
requirements are met.” First, the regulatory scheme must “be 
informed by a substantial government interest.” Second, 
warrantless searches must be necessary to further that 
government interest. Third, the regulatory scheme must “provide 
a ‘constitutionally adequate substitute’ for a warrant in terms of 
the certainty and regularity of the program’s application.”
54
 
The rationale behind this exception is that an owner of premises subject to a 
pervasively regulated industry has a reduced expectation of privacy, and 




In reaching its conclusion, the court considered each of the above 
requirements in turn.  First, the court found that the oil and gas industry is 
closely regulated because the “COGCC is empowered to ‘do whatever may 
reasonably be necessary to carry out the provisions of’” the Oil and Gas 
Conservation Act (“Act”) and “has promulgated comprehensive rules 
regulating multitudinous aspects of the oil and gas industry.”
56
  The court 
                                                                                                                 
 50. Id. at ¶ 1, 2018 WL 1417462 at *1. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at ¶ 16, 2018 WL 1417462 at *3. 
 53. See id. at ¶ 24, 2018 WL 1417462 at *4. 
 54. Id. at ¶ 20, 2018 WL 1417462 at *4 (quoting New York v. Burger, 682 U.S. 691, 
700 (1987)). 
 55. Id. at ¶ 21, 2018 WL 1417462 at *4 (citing Marshall v. Barlow’s Inc., 436 U.S. 307 
(1978)). 
 56. Id. at ¶ 26, 2018 WL 1417462 at *5. 
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determined that, based upon the Act’s directive that “it is ‘in the public 
interest’ to ‘[f]oster the responsible, balanced development, production, and 
utilization of the natural resources of oil and gas in the state of Colorado in 
a manner consistent with protection of public health, safety, and welfare, 
including protection of the environment and wildlife resources,’”
57
 together 
with the COGCC’s robust regulatory scheme, the state has a substantial 
interest in regulating the oil and gas industry.
58
  Next, the court explained 
that warrantless searches are necessary to effectuate the state’s interest 
because “[r]equiring that inspectors apply to a court for a warrant before 
each inspection would dramatically reduce COGCC’s enforcement power, 
and might allow operators to conceal violations.”
59
  Finally, the court found 
that the COGCC’s inspections were frequent enough that landowners had 
an expectation that their property would be periodically inspected and that 
the COGCC was subject to a reasonableness requirement that restricts their 
authority to conduct random inspections; thus, a “constitutionally adequate 
substitute for a warrant” is provided for in the COGCC’s regulatory 
regime.
60
  Note that while the above analysis was performed with respect to 
the Fourth Amendment under the United States Constitution, the court 
stated that the result was the same under the Colorado Constitution.
61
 
Several other issues were raised on appeal.  O’Hare argued that Rule 204 
was “unconstitutional as applied to surface owners” who did not own the 
minerals.
62
  The court disagreed in this case as O’Hare had signed a surface 
use agreement with Maralex granting “an extraordinarily broad set of 
rights”;
63
 the court also opined that “in other cases where a surface owner 
has granted a mineral lessee a broad surface easement, warrantless entry of 
the surface estate would not necessarily violate the surface owner’s 
rights.”
64
  Maralex also challenged the COGCC’s order as violating several 
COGCC rules.  Of import, the court agreed that the COGCC was arbitrary 
and capricious in its determination that Maralex had failed to provide 
access to wells on the O’Hare’s property “at ‘all reasonable times’.”
65
  
Specifically, the court noted that the inspector had agreed to delay the 
                                                                                                                 
 57. Id. at ¶ 25-30, 2018 WL 1417462 at *5. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at ¶ 30, 2018 WL 1417462 at *5. 
 60. Id. at ¶¶ 32-33, 2018 WL 1417462 at *6. 
 61. Id. at ¶ 35, 2018 WL 1417462 at *6. 
 62. Id. at ¶ 38, 2018 WL 1417462 at *6. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at ¶ 39, 2018 WL 1417462 at *7. 
 65. Id. at ¶ 45, 2018 WL 1417462 at *7. 
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inspection to the following day until O’Hare was back in town, and the 
mere fact that the inspector did not hear back until the afternoon of the 
following day, as opposed to “oil-field early,” was not substantial evidence 
to support COGCC’s determination.
66
  The court rejected all other 
arguments by Maralex. 
C. Breach of Contract Under Area of Mutual Interest Agreement 
In Spring Creek Expl. & Prod. Co., LLC v. Hess Bakken Inv., II, LLC,
67
 
the court considered several questions on appeal
68
 pertaining to various 
contracts entered among oil and gas companies, including an area of mutual 
interest agreement (“AMI Agreement”).  The AMI Agreement, by and 
among Spring Creek Exploration & Production Company, LLC (“Spring 
Creek”), Gold Coast Energy, LLC (“Gold Coast”) and Hess Bakken 
Investments II, LLC (“Hess’), was valid for a term of three years, and 
provided, in relevant part:  
During the term of the AMI, only [Hess] may proceed to lease or 
otherwise acquire interests within the AMI.  If, during the term 
of the AMI, [Hess] should acquire any oil and gas lease, 
leasehold interest or mineral interest, [Hess] should . . . offer 
such interest to Coachman
69
 in the following proportions, [Hess] 
(90%), Coachman (10%), pursuant to that certain Participation 




The AMI Agreement further provided that Spring Creek and Gold Coast 
would receive an overriding royalty interest (“ORRI”) on new leases 
acquired by Hess during the AMI term.
71
 
The AMI Agreement was executed in conjunction with the “Tomahawk 
Agreement,” covering a small portion of lands within a larger area known 
to Hess as the Rough Rider Prospect, subject to a separate agreement 
(“Rough Rider Agreement”) one of its affiliates had entered in to with 
Statoil Oil & Gas LP (“Statoil”).  The Rough Rider Agreement prohibited 
                                                                                                                 
 66. See id. 
 67. 887 F.3d 1003 (10th Cir. 2018). 
 68. The only issues discussed herein are those decided by applying Colorado law; the 
Tenth Circuit also applied North Dakota law to other issues and claims on appeals. 
 69. Id. at 1010.  (Coachman Energy was a predecessor of Spring Creek and Gold 
Coast.). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
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Hess from acquiring new leases in the Rough Rider Prospect for a period of 
one year.
72
  Hess entered into the Tomahawk Agreement with Spring Creek, 
Gold Coast and Coachman Energy during the one year non-compete 
period.
73
  Statoil brought suit against Hess, and Statoil and Hess ultimately 
reached a settlement agreement (“Settlement”) wherein Hess sold most of 
its Tomahawk leases to Statoil at a discount and Hess agreed that any 
additional leases acquired would be offered to Statoil at cost.
74
  The AMI 
Agreement was not assigned from Hess to Statoil.
75
 
Neither Spring Creek nor Gold Coast were privy to the settlement 
negotiations or the Settlement itself.  Hess did not acquire any new leases 
during the remainder of the AMI term but resumed lease acquisitions at its 
expiration.
76
  Statoil, on the other hand, acquired numerous leasehold 
interests during the term of the AMI.
77
 
Applying Colorado law, the Tenth Circuit court considered whether Hess 
breached the AMI Agreement by failing to acquire any new leases during 
its term.  The court found that “[t]he AMI Agreement plainly does not 
require Hess to acquire new leases,” but rather provides that if Hess should 
acquire new leases, then Spring Creek and Gold Hill would be entitled to an 
ORRI thereon.
78
  The court also found that there was no breach of an 
implied covenant to acquire new leases given that Hess had no duty to 
obtain new leases at all.
79
  
Additionally, when considering whether Hess’ actions constituted 
fraudulent concealment, the court agreed this tort claim was barred by the 
economic loss rule.
80
  Spring Creek relied on a 1990 decision of the 
Colorado Court of Appeals that had affirmed an award of money damages 
for fraudulent concealment, H&H Distribs., Inc. v. BBC Int’l, Inc.,
81
 but this 
opinion, which had been issued before the Colorado Supreme Court 
                                                                                                                 
 72. Id. at 1009. 
 73. Id. at 1009-10. 
 74. Id. at 1010-11. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 1011.  (New leasing actually resumed three months after the Settlement was 
reached, referred to therein as the “three-month tail” period).  Id. at 1010-11. 
 77. See Id. 
 78. See Id. at 1018. 
 79. Id. at 1019-20. 
 80. Id. at 1021-23. 
 81. Id. at 1021 (H&H Distribs., Inc. v. BBC Int’l, Inc., 812 P.2d 659 (Colo. App. 1990); 
internal citations omitted). 
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adopted the economic loss rule, was deemed by the court to likely no longer 
be good precedent.  
82
 
D. Law Firm’s Responsibility in Negotiation for Undisclosed Principal 
In Rocky Mountain Expl., Inc. v. Davis Graham & Stubbs LLP,
83
 Rocky 
Mountain Exploration, Inc. (“RMEI”) brought suit against the law firm of 
Davis Graham & Stubbs LLC (“DGS”), for, among other things, breach of 
fiduciary duty, fraud, and civil conspiracy.  The claims arose from DGS’s 
representation of Tracker Resource Exploration NC, LLC (“Tracker”), as 
principal of Lario Oil and Gas Company (“Lario”), agent and purchaser of 
certain assets from RMEI.  RMEI and Tracker entered into agreements with 
one another covering certain oil and gas leaseholds in North Dakota, 
wherein RMEI agreed to sell eighty percent of its interest to Tracker.
84
  In 
connection therewith, RMEI and Tracker entered into an area-of-mutual 
interest agreement, an operating agreement, and a participation agreement.
85
  
The operating agreement expressly disclaimed any joint venture or 
fiduciary relationship between RMEI and Tracker and stated that it, 
together with the participation agreement, constituted the entire agreement 
between the parties, superseding all prior agreements.
86
   
The relationship between Tracker and RMEI eventually deteriorated and 
Tracker unsuccessfully attempted to purchase RMEI’s 20% interest.
87
  
Lario then offered to purchase RMEI’s interest, striking a separate 
agreement with Tracker that it would assign 75% of its acquired interest to 
Tracker; the parties further agreed that they would not disclose Tracker’s 
involvement in the transaction to RMEI.
88
  RMEI accepted Lario’s offer 
and the parties entered into an agreement (“Letter Agreement”).
89
  DGS had 
previously represented Tracker, and Lario sought to have DGS represent 
them in the transaction; however, DGS determined there was a conflict of 
interest.
90
  As such, DGS continued to represent only Tracker, preparing 
many of the deal documents, though certain email correspondence 
referenced DGS as Lario’s counsel.
91
  The transaction between RMEI and 
                                                                                                                 
 82. Id. at 1022. 
 83. 2018 CO 54, 420 P.3d 223 (Colo. 2018). 
 84. Id. at ¶ 11, 420 P.3d. at 227. 
 85. Id. at ¶¶ 11-12, 420 P.3d. at 227. 
 86. Id. at ¶ 12, 420 P.3d. at 227. 
 87. Id. at ¶ 13, 420 P.3d. at 227. 
 88. Id. at ¶ 15-17, 420 P.3d. at 227-28. 
 89. Id. at ¶ 17, 420 P.3d. at 228. 
 90. Id. at ¶ 16, 420 P.3d. at 228. 
 91. Id. at ¶¶ 16-19, 420 P.3d. at 228. 
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Lario closed, and on the same date Lario transferred the contemplated 
interest to Tracker, at which point RMEI learned of Tracker’s involvement 
and filed suit against Tracker, Lario, certain of their officers, and DGS.
92
   
Lario and Tracker eventually settled their claims, but RMEI brought 
claims against DGS, alleging it “(1) engaged in a civil conspiracy to 
misappropriate RMEI’s interests in the leaseholds at issue by setting up 
Lario as a strawman purchaser; (2) aided and abetted Tracker’s breach of its 
fiduciary duty to RMEI; (3) committed fraud; (4) engaged in a civil 
conspiracy to commit fraud; and (5) aided and abetted fraud.”
93
  The 
District Court granted DGS’s motion for summary judgment and the Court 
of Appeals affirmed.
94




In considering the above questions, the court reiterated the distinction 
between an undisclosed and an unidentified principal as set forth in the 
Section 1.04(2) of the Restatement (Third) of Agency: “A principal is 
undisclosed if the third party has no notice that the agent is acting for a 
principal,” whereas “[a] principal is unidentified if the third party has notice 
that the agent is acting for a principal but does not have notice of the 
principal’s identity.”
96
  It is well known that “when an agent for an 
undisclosed principal enters into a contract, the other party to that contract 
may avoid the contract if (1) the agent falsely represents to the third party 
that the agent does not act on behalf of a principal and (2) the principal or 
agent had notice that the third party would not have dealt with the 
principal”;
97
 however, “this rule does not apply to agents who act on behalf 
of unidentified, as opposed to undisclosed, principals.”
98
   
The court found that Tracker was an unidentified principal of Lario due 
to disclosures contained in the agreements between Lario and RMEI.  
Specifically, the Letter Agreement stated that Lario had venture partners in 
the transaction,
99
 and further provided that “Lario has other investors or 
                                                                                                                 
 92. Id. at ¶¶ 19-21, 420 P.3d. at 228. 
 93. Id. at ¶ 21, 420 P.3d. at 228. 
 94. Id. at ¶ 7, 420 P.3d. at 226. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at ¶ 30, 420 P.3d. at 230 (citing Restatement (Third) of Agency § 1.04(2)). 
 97. Id. at ¶ 33, 420 P.3d. at 230. 
 98. Id. (citing Restatement (Third) of Agency § 6.11(4)) (emphasis added). 
 99. Id. at ¶ 38, 420 P.3d. at 231-32 (“The Parties shall not disclose the existence of this 
Letter Agreement and its contents to any third party, except . . . to each Party’s . . . investors 
(including Buyer’s venture partners in this transaction) . . . directly and solely for the 
purpose of evaluating the proposed transaction.”). 
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partners who may elect to join in the acquisition of the Properties under the 
terms of this Letter Agreement.”
100
  Moreover, the Letter Agreement stated 
that “Lario shall have the right to assign a portion but not all of its interest 
in this Letter Agreement to such investors or partners.”
101
 Because Tracker 
was an unidentified, and not an undisclosed, principal, the court rejected 
RMEI’s civil conspiracy claim and found that RMEI could not avoid the 
sale to Lario.
102
  Likewise, as previously stated above, the agreement 
between Tracker and RMEI expressly disclaimed any fiduciary duty 
between the parties, and additionally stated that it constituted the entire 
agreement between the parties and superseded all prior agreements; 
therefore, RMEI’s breach of fiduciary duty claim also failed.
103
 
As for the fraud claims against DGS, RMEI argued that DGS pretended 
to represent Lario and that Lario acted alone in its transaction with 
RMEI.
104
  Although certain emails referenced DGS as Lario’s counsel, and 
DGS did not correct such misstatements, the court found nothing of 
“definite and specific character” to indicate that DGS was not representing 
Tracker.
105
  Thus, at best, the court said DGS’s actions could amount to 
fraudulent concealment; however, it also found that DGS did not owe 
RMEI a duty to disclose Tracker’s involvement, and such a duty, if 
imposed, would essentially eliminate the ability to conduct transactions 
with undisclosed principals.
106
  Moreover, it would interfere with an 
attorney’s duties of loyalty and confidentiality to his or her clients.
107
  Thus, 
the court found that DGS did not commit fraud.
108
 
E. Update on Martinez Case 
In January 2018, the Colorado Supreme Court granted a petition for writ 
of certiorari to review the decision of the Colorado Court of Appeals in 
Case No. 2016CA564, Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Comm’n v. 
Martinez.
109
  As noted in last year’s Colorado article,
110
 the Court of 
                                                                                                                 
 100. Id. at ¶ 39, 420 P.3d. at 232. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at ¶¶ 42, 46, 420 P.3d. at 232-33. 
 103. Id. at ¶¶ 63-64, 420 P.3d. at 235. 
 104. Id. at ¶ 52, 420 P.3d. at 233. 
 105. Id. at ¶ 55, 420 P.3d. at 234. 
 106. Id. at ¶¶ 56-57, 420 P.3d. at 234. 
 107. Id. at ¶ 57, 420 P.3d. at 234. 
 108. See id. 
 109. Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Comm’n v. Martinez, No. 17SC297, 2018 WL 
582105, *1 (Colo. Jan. 29, 2018). 
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Appeals’ decision in Martinez focused on the intended meaning of the 
following statutory provision: 
(1)(a) It is declared to be in the public interest to: . . . (I) Foster 
the responsible, balanced development, production, and 
utilization of the natural resources of oil and gas in the state of 
Colorado in a manner consistent with protection of public health, 
safety, and welfare, including protection of the environment and 
wildlife resources; . . .
111
 
The Petitioners’ argued that public health, safety, and welfare, including 
protection of the environment and wildlife resources, were considerations 
that must be taken into account when authorizing oil and gas development, 
but were not interests that such development should be balanced with or 
against.
112
  The court of appeals ultimately agreed with the Petitioners. 
On May 18, 2017, two separate Petitions for Writ of Certiorari were filed 
with the Colorado Supreme Court, one by the attorneys for the American 
Petroleum Institute and Colorado Petroleum Association (Intervenors) and 
one for the COGCC (Petitioner), seeking review of the court of appeals 
decision in Martinez.  The Colorado Supreme Court granted these petitions,  
phrasing the precise issue for consideration as follows:  “Whether the court 
of appeals erred in determining that the Colorado Oil and Gas Commission 
misinterpreted section 34-60-102(1)(a)(l), C. R. S., as requiring a balance 
between oil and gas development and public health, safety, and welfare.”
113
   
As of this date, the Colorado Supreme Court has not issued an opinion.  
Oral argument is presently scheduled for October 16, 2018. 
III. Legislation 
During the 2018 legislative session, more than forty bills were 
introduced which could have had a material impact on the oil and gas 
industry.
114
  These bills dealt with issues related to oil and gas, the Colorado 
Energy Office, renewable energy, and 8-1-1 (Call Before You Dig).
115
   
                                                                                                                 
 110. Casey C. Breese, David R. Little, & Diana S. Prulhiere, Colorado, 3 OIL & GAS, 
NAT. RESOURCES & ENERGY J. 663, 668 et seq (2017). 
 111. COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-102, effective July 1, 2007. 
 112. Martinez v. Colorado Oil & Gas Conserv. Comm., 2017 COA 37, ¶ 18, 2017 WL 
1089556 at *4 (Colo. App. Mar. 23, 2017). 
 113. Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission v. Martinez, No. 17SC297, 2018 
WL 582105 at *1 (Colorado Jan. 29, 2018). 
 114. See All Bills, 71st Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2018), 
https://leg.colorado.gov/bill-
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A. Select New Legislation 
Two bills were passed by the Colorado General Assembly during 2018 
that materially affected the oil and gas industry.  The most important of 
these bills was Senate Bill (“SB”) 18-230.   
SB 18-230 amended and updated the statutory spacing and pooling 
provisions set out in Colo. Rev. Stat. § 34-60-116 in five significant 
ways.
116
  First, the bill amended Colo. Rev. Stat. § 34-60-116(1) to clarify 
that a spacing or pooling order issued by the COGCC may only cover a 
portion of an oil and gas pool instead of the entire pool.
117
  Second, the bill 
amended several provisions in the statute, including Colo. Rev. Stat. § 34-
60-116(3), to confirm that a spacing or pooling order issued by the COGCC 
may authorize one or more wells per drilling unit.
118
  These changes were 
intended to update the statute to mirror current COGCC practice. 
The third material change amended Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 34-60-
116(7)(a)(I) and 34-60-116(7)(a)(II) to require pooling orders issued by the 
COGCC to more clearly specify the interests being pooled.  These changes 
also clarified that the creation of royalty or overriding royalty interests 
intended to avoid statutory pooling penalties need not be recognized by the 
COGCC.  Specifically, royalty interest are to be excluded from the 
obligation to pay costs only “if and to the extent that the royalty is 
consistent with the lease terms prevailing in the area and is not designed to 
avoid the recovery of costs provided for in subsection 7(b) of this 
section.”
119
   
Next, a new provision, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 34-60-116(7)(a)(III) was 
added.  It provides that pooling orders issued by the COGCC shall 
“[s]pecify that a nonconsenting owner is immune from liability for costs 
arising from spills, releases, damage, or injury resulting from oil and gas 
operations on the drilling unit.”
120
   
                                                                                                                 
search?field_subjects[0]=40&field_subjects[1]=38&field_sessions=45771&field_chamber=
All&field_bill_type=All&sort_bef_combine=search_api_relevance%20DESC. (last visited 
July 16, 2018). 
 115. 71st Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2018), https://leg.colorado.gov/bill-
search?field_sessions=45771&sort_bef_combine=field_bill_number%20ASC (Search for 
Subjects: Energy, Natural Resources & Environment)(last visited July 16, 2018). 
 116. The COGCC is presently considering a proposed rulemaking to implement these 
legislative changes.   
 117. 2018 Colo. Legis. Serv. Ch. 361 (West).   
 118. Id. 
 119. Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 34-60-116(7)(a)(I) (as amended in 2018). 
 120. Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 34-60-116(7)(a)(III) (as amended in 2018). 
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Finally, SB 18-230 amended Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 34-60-116(7)(d)(I) to 
slow down the statutory pooling process and provide more information for 
parties who might be pooled.  The amendments clarify that the COGCC 
may not issue a pooling order unless at least sixty days have passed 
between the date of an offer to each owner to participate in the proposed 
well or lease its interest and the date of the hearing.
121
  The offers to 
participate or lease must also now “include a copy of or link to a brochure 
supplied by the commission that clearly and concisely describes the pooling 
procedures specified in this section and the mineral owner’s options 
pursuant to those procedures.”
122
 
The other material legislation which passed was House Bill (“HB”) 18-
1098.  HB 18-1098 amended Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 34-60-122(b) by adding a 
new sentence permitting the COGCC to retain funds it collects from oil and 
gas companies for purposes of the environmental response fund instead of 
having these funds transferred at the end of each fiscal year to the general 
fund.
123
  As amended, Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 34-60-122(b) now states that 
“[t]he year-end balance of the account remains in the account.”
124
  This 
change will provide greater funding for the COGCC to remediate 
abandoned oil and gas locations. 
B. Indefinitely Postponed Bills 
A number of additional bills affecting the oil and gas industry were 
introduced and debated but failed to pass scrutiny in the House or the 
Senate during the 2018 legislative session.  Below are quick summaries of 
eleven of these bills. 
1. HB 18-1071: Intended to codify Martinez, this bill would have 
more expressly and definitively required the regulation of oil and 
gas operations in a manner consistent with public health, safety, 
and welfare without also considering the need for the 
development of oil and gas resources.
125
 
                                                                                                                 
 121. 2018 Colo. Legis. Serv. Ch. 361 (West).   
 122. Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 34-60-116(7)(d)(I) (as amended in 2018). 
 123. 2018 Colo. Legis. Serv. Ch. 107 (West). 
 124. Id. 
 125. H.B. 18-1071, 71st Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2018). 
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2. HB 18-1150: Would have rendered a local government liable for 
damages to operators, mineral lessees, and royalty owners for 
bans on hydraulic fracturing.
126
 




4. HB 18-1289: Would have exempted local government and 
school district lands from statutory pooling.
128
 
5. HB 18-1301: Would have required most reclamation plans to 
demonstrate (by substantial evidence) an end date for any water 
quality treatment necessary to ensure compliance with applicable 
water quality standards, eliminate the existing self-bonding 
option, and require that all reclamation bonds include financial 
assurances of a certain amount.
129
 
6. HB 18-1382: Would have created an Energy Legislative Review 
Committee to study energy development, grid security, energy 
supply and transmission planning, and other issues that affect 
energy policy in Colorado, beginning in 2019.
130
 
7. HB 18-1352: Would have required oil and gas facilities and 
wells to be located at least 1,000 feet from school buildings and 
other high occupancy buildings, as applied to the school property 
line; would not apply if a school commences operations near 
such facilities or wells that are already actively in use.
131
 
8. HB 18-1419: Would have mandated that the COGCC 
promulgate rules “as soon as practicable” to ensure proper 
wellhead integrity of oil and gas production wells. The Bill 
would have also required an oil and gas operator to give 
electronic notice of each flow line and gathering pipeline 
installed, owned, or operated by the operator to each local 




                                                                                                                 
 126. H.B. 18-1150, 71st Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2018). 
 127. H.B. 18-1157, 71st Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2018). 
 128. H.B. 18-1289, 71st Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2018). 
 129. H.B. 18-1301, 71st Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2018). 
 130. H.B. 18-1382, 71st Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2018).  
 131. H.B. 18-1352, 71st Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2018). 
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10. SB 18-064: Would have updated the renewable energy standard 
to require that all electric utilities, including cooperative electric 
associations and municipally owned utilities, to derive their 
energy from 100% renewable energy by 2035.
134
 
11. SB 18-192: Would have made local governments that ban 
hydraulic fracturing of an oil and gas well liable to the mineral 
interest owners for the value of the mineral interest; would have 
further required local governments that enact a moratorium on 
oil and gas activities to compensate oil and gas operators, 
mineral lessees, and royalty owners for all costs, damages, and 
losses of fair market value associated with that moratorium.
135
 
IV. State Regulation 
During the period of this update, the COGCC completed one major 
rulemaking affecting flowlines.  The COGCC approved comprehensive 
new flowline regulations incorporated into COGCC Rules in a unanimous 
nine-member vote on February 13, 2018.
136
  The goal of this rulemaking 
was essentially to create a new set of cradle to grave rules specifically for 
flowlines.
137
  The regulations address oversight of flowlines and related 
infrastructure associated with oil and gas development.
138
 They strengthen 
requirements and establish new standards for the design, installation, 
maintenance, testing, tracking, and abandoning of flowlines.
139
  
V. Ballot Initiatives 
Dozens of ballot initiatives aimed at amending the Colorado Constitution 
or Colorado statutes were proposed during the period of this update and 
began the long administrative process of seeking to be placed on the 2018 
                                                                                                                 
 133. S.B. 18-063, 71st Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2018). 
 134. S.B. 18-064, 71st Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2018). 
 135. S.B. 18-192, 71st Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2018). 
 136. COGCC Approves Comprehensive New Flowline Regulations (Feb. 13, 2018), 
https://www.colorado.gov/governor/news/cogcc-approves-comprehensive-new-flowline-
regulations. 
 137. See id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
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statewide general election ballot.
140
  Of these proposals, two initiatives that 
materially impact the oil and gas industry have survived the gauntlet and 
will appear on the 2018 statewide general election ballot. 
The first is Proposition 97, entitled “Setback Requirement for Oil and 
Gas Development.”  Proposition 97 would enact a new statute, Colo. Rev. 
Stat. § 34-60-131, as a part of the Act.
141
  Section 34-60-131(3) of this 
proposed legislation would “establish that all new oil and gas development 
not on federal land must be located at least two thousand five hundred feet 
from an occupied structure or vulnerable area,” the italicized terms all 
being defined under the proposed initiative.
142
  A recent study by the 
COGCC determined that, if passed, this initiative would make the majority 
of lands in Colorado unavailable for oil and gas development, including a 
very high percentage of those lands near cities or suburban 
developments.
143
   
The other initiative is Proposition 108, entitled “Just Compensation for 
Reduction in Fair Market Value by Government Law or Regulation.”
144
  It 
proposes to amend Section 15 of Article H of the Colorado Constitution by 
adding the following capitalized text to the existing constitutional 
provision:  “Private property shall not be taken, or damaged, OR 
REDUCED IN FAIR MARKET VALUE BY GOVERNMENT LAW OR 
REGULATION for public or private use, without just compensation.”
145
  
One purpose of this initiative would be to require state or local governments 
to compensate mineral owners and other mineral interest owners for 
damages accruing from drilling bans or other government regulation. 
Colorado’s 2018 general election is scheduled for November 6, 2018. 
 
                                                                                                                 
 140. These initiatives are listed, summarized and documented on the Colorado Secretary 
of State website, https://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/elections/Initiatives/titleBoard/index.html 
(last visited on September 3, 2018). 
 141. The final text of Proposition 97 is available on the Colorado Secretary of State 
website, https://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/elections/Initiatives/titleBoard/index.html (last 
visited on September 11, 2018). 
 142. Id. (emphasis added).  
 143. This COGCC study may be found at https://cogcc.state.co.us/documents/library/ 
Technical/Miscellaneous/COGCC_2018_Init_97_GIS_Assessment_20180702.pdf. 
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visited on September 11, 2018). 
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